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ABSTRACT
Logistics is an age old problem that has been the key
to the greatest victories and defeats in history. Maritime
support of wartime land campaigns as well as conflicts at
sea, has been the anSwer to that problem even as far back
in history as the ancient Greek Empire. Throughout the
ages however the lesson that seems to be learned and
relearned, the hard way, is that of logistic support.
Today the United States is faced with what, to Some
SeemS to be an overwhelming problem in logistic support
overseas, particularly in the maritime transportation and
support arena . The U.S. flag merchant fleet is in no
position to s u p p o r t even a medium sized conflict overseas.
At the same time, our "peacetime" logistic security is
continually threatened by the ebb and flow of other
"friendly" nations' political attitudes.
One option is the development of deployable mobile
base and port structures. In many ways less expensive than
permanent overseas basing facilities, mobile bases/ports
could be a solution to some of the current maritime
logistics woeS of the U.S. By providing an alternative to
fixed sea/air bases, the above two problems could be dim-
inished. In addition, mobile overSeas base facilities
could provide military commanders with new strategic and
tactical options during a crisis or conflict. They could
give new meaning to the term "disaster relief" or even one
day provide new economic options for entire nations.
The technology for giant mobile ocean bases exists,
but the capability to efficiently produce and use such
facilities are still fifteen to twenty years away. In the
interim, there is still a need for a mobile base
capability. Use of existing offshore construction and
mining operations equipment such as various drilling
platform designs, giant support barges and floating port
construction methods can fill the gap.
There is historic and up to date data on the use of
such designs for a multitude of purposes, including those
stated above . An analysis of currently available equipment
and capabilities can aid in making a choice, but as always
cost effectiveness is a major factor in the decision. In
this case however, there are high stakes in political
costs as well as capital costs.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to investigate and
evaluate some of the alternatives to traditional port
construction methods. Currently. the United States (U. S . )
is faced with the possible closure of overseaS military
installations which are vital to its national defense and
the security of its allies. Of particular concern in this
examination are naval bases and marine terminals which are
vital to the logistic support of conflicts in theaters
outside the range of direct support from the U.S.
Discussion
There is a great deal to consider in the planning for
a maritime/naval base of operations. Besides the physical
considerations of location and size, there is also a need
to consider the services which are unique to a military
establishment. To incorporate all facets of operations
in to a single unit is a challenge even when there is a
large land area to use.
not
The
very
\
problem is, however that the land and
often available. This is usually due
space
to
is
the
simple fact that the place best suited to build a base
belongs to some other nation. Development of a port within
your own territory affords the ability to purchase the
land outright . This is not true elsewhere.
The search for oil and gas has moved from the land to
about new technologies for exploration,
points
brought
further and further out to sea. This quest has
drilling
and transportation. It is with these technological
developments that the options for developing more
versatile and efficient port facilities around the world
exist. These facilities will be more secure from the
political winds which presently threaten to close existing
bases resulting in the loss of mi lli ons of dollars
invested in their construction. In addition, they will
also provide an extra measure of rapid deployment in the
case of a natural disaster or hostilities cropping up
around the world.
Decisions must be made, however. As the nation's
attention turns toward controlling the budget deficit, the
costs of any endeavor are of paramount concern. Since in
theory , costs are cut by mass production; which one of the
methods currently available for base or port construction
will be the most versatile and efficient?
The methods under discussion at various levels of
government and military organizations center upon three
basic offshore platforms as a basis for mobile/deployable
2
port facilities and military bases. The first is based on
the semi-submersible type of drilling platform. The second
involves the USe of the "jack-up" style of offshore
which are used for servicing offshore operations,
The third design centers around largeplatform.
pier structures. This includes the use of giant
floating
barges,
pontoon
type pier structures and the increasingly popular USe of
advanced cement technology in the construction of floating
piers.
Hypothesis
Recent Department of Defense studies have looked in
detail at the possibl~ alternatives to fixed bases
overseas. There are a number of organizations providing
the technical data for the future of mobile bases. The
somethatcommon denominator in these investigations is
sort of floating facility is always an option.
It is hypothesized that the offshore service barge or
floating pier design can provide the versatility and
efficiency required for the purpose of building a mobile
base. It is also the least expensive alternative, making
it the choice for a large scale effort to build both
·permanent· bases overseas and highly mobile, rapid
deployment/crisis operations bases.
In support of this hypothesis, a history of the
problem and options are first explored, highlighting the
3
general advantages of the mobile, modular base/port over
the fixed traditional facility. Additionally, the
engineering concepts of construction for each are also
three alternative
of construction are then made, with
briefly
methods
outlined. Comparisons of the
emphasis on
the near term availability and versatility. This is used
to make a judgment on which type/style can be most readily
available for deployment and provide the most options for
operations.
The basic information for this study has been
collected from interviews, reports and briefings provided
Port Hueneme, California; the David Taylor
from three
Laboratory,
bas i c s o ur c e s : the Naval Civil Engineering
research Center, Bethesda, Maryland; and the Naval War
College, Newport, Rhode Island . Other supporting data and
current information has been obtained from various marine
related periodicals as well as port and marine engineering
reference books. The author has also relied upon personal
expertise and knowledge of strategic sealift, operational
logistics and naval operations to make a critical
evaluation of the options available.
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CHAPTER II
u.s. OVERSEAS BASES
Situation
Currently, the United States operates approximately
seven hundred bases in thirty seven countries around the
world (Figure 1). About one-third of these bases are very
small and are of little importance within the scope of
this discussion. Of the total, about 500 bases are located
in West Germany or the United Kingdom. While most of these
should be considered important, they are not at risk of
being lost. Of what remains, there exists a number of very
important bases located in nineteen other countries, where
they may be considered ·at risk" of being lost for use at
any time (Table 1). U.S. bases in Spain, Greece and the
Philippines for example, are under pressure on a regular
basis from the host nations' governments. Threats to close
bases or reduce basing rights in these and other
uSe of these
the anti-Americancountries,
sentiment,
government,
are
both
or the
result
outside
of
and
either
within
threats
the
as
nation's
a hammer
against the U.S. to accomplish some political end. Radical
changes in a nations leadership quite often results in one
or both of the above problems.
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FIGURE 1
U.S. Overseas Rase Concentrations
(8DM, 1988)
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TABLE 1
Countries Considered At Risk for
U.S. Overseas Bases
(BDM, 1988)
Antigua
Ascension Island
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bermuda
Greece
Johnston Island
Midway
New Zealand
Panama
7
Philippines
Por tugal (Azores)
Seychelles
South Africa
Spain
Thailand
Turkey
Virgin Islands
Wake Island
This dilemma is nothing new. The numbers of u.s.
advance bases around the world has been declining steadily
since the end of the Second World War (Figure 2). Although
the NATO related bases in Europe (mostly northern Europe)
have been holding steady, facilities located in the
Pacific region and other more remote areas (South America
and the Indian Ocean for example) have suffered badly.
Recently it has been in these areas that the crisises have
been occurring. leaving the U.S., and other friendly
nations in a position to provide support only in a very
expensive an inefficient manner.
The Persian Gulf War was the most obvious example of
this situation (Figure 3). Food, fuel. ammunition and
other supplies had to be shuttled long distances directly
from the U.S. in order to support the U.S. naval presence
in the area. The closest U.S. Base in the area is at Diego
Garcia. thousands of miles away. So for repairs a ship had
either take long periods of time off station to get to
that base. or very large sums of money had to be spent to
temporarily USe very limited berthing facilities closer to
the operating area. In the caSe of regular resupply, food,
fuel and ammunition waS shuttled from Diego Garcia and the
Philippines to the operations area. This waS because there
was no place nearby where large amounts of these items
(especially explosive materials) could be staged from. The
ships providing this shuttle service had to
8
operate on
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irregular schedules at very rapid speeds. This required
use of a great deal of fuel at great cost.
The provision of effective lines of communication and
logistics is dependent on the use of the sea lanes. If,
however, there is no port to use either because one does
not exist or one has been restricted in its use, then an
alternative must be found to open those lines.
The Costs
getting more difficult
The
facility
cost
is
of establishing a naval/maritime
to determine.
port
The
permit and fixed costs are no longer the only categories
to be considered. There is also the risk that must be
figured into the cost equation.
The political risks are very hard to establish. Would
the accesS to a particular piece of real estate be worth
having to deal with a third world dictator? What would be
the implications of cooperating with a nation which is not
on friendly terms with other allies? These are questions
that must somehow be answered.
The risk of base loss is also of great importance.
u.s. facilities in Viet Nam were totally lost to the
enemy. The naval/air base at Cam Ranh Bay had a large
amount of capital invested in it, but there was no way to
fixed base superstructure.retrieve
not only
the
as a Vietnamese
11
base, but
Today it
as the
serves
forward
deployment location for the Soviet Pacific Fleet.
Then there is the price on the quality of life .
Providing the services and support to the personnel who
work at the facility, military and others, also costs more
as the standards demanded by society are met. This is true
even without considering the dependents who might be
accompanying base staff/work force. Security also figures
prominently here. Due to increasing pressure of terrorism
around the world, the United States spends ever increasing
amounts on personnel and physical security.
In combination with the sometimes extremely high
permit costs, which may be exacted by the "host" nation,
the construction and procurement costs required to build
and establish a new port or naval base are extremely high
(Figure 4). Although the simple answer to the loss of a
base might be to just replace it elsewhere, the physical
movement of a fixed base is impossible and the costs and
investments lost by rebuilding on a regular basis should
be considered totally unacceptable.
In order
Port Development
to adequately discuss alternatives to a
fixed base/port facility, it is important to understand
how it got there in the first place. A military marine
base has a great deal in common with a commercial marine
terminal. Both share a great number common operations, but
12
FIGURE 4
U.s. Overseas Basing Costs
CBDM, 1988)
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the purpose in their existence are very different.
and an area within which ships are loaded with
The
"terminal
traditional definition of a seaport is as a
and/or discharged of cargo .. . · (Branch, 1986). This
concept, although still valid, has expanded in its
basic
scope.
Today the seaport, more appropriately referred to as an
ocean terminal, exists as a link in the overall trade
chain. This point in the chain has four basic roles:
provision of shelter from the elements; 2) cargo and
three
passenger handling; 3) support services for ships; and 4)
a base for industrial development (Branch, 1986).
There is a direct correlation of the first
items above in relation to the roles of a military marine
base. The fourth, a base for industrial development, has
no direct correlation. The many roles of a base will be
discussed further later. At this point it is important to
note that the purpose, location and functions of a
military base is not related directly to industrial
growth. Industries related to the workings of ships and
their support may develop around the base, but that is not
the driving force in its development.
Further, the choice of location for each has many
parallels a S we 1 1. Pol i ticali n fluen c e S, cos t s , climate,
and range of facilities available are all common factors
to be considered. Of courSe the access to Sea lines of
communication is important to each as well, but for vastly
14
different reasons. A commercial port seeks to exploit
those trade routes , and a military marine base seeks to
provide protection.
of each seek to locate near land and airDevelopers
transportation links . This again is for diverse reasons.
The commercial facility seeks to become a major link in
the trade chain. The base will hopefully become a link in
a line of defense which includes military aviation, as
well as ground and naval forces.
Finally, the similarities in operational efficiency
in U.S. ports and military bases are driven by opposite
of port management . Both seek economic answerspoles
such considerations such as port layout,
to
equipment
purchase and even labor costs are a concern to the
management
economies
of each. The driving forces which seek
are not the Same. Traditional control of
those
ports
in the u.s. has been through private enterprise.
Governmental controls do not exist at a federal level.
There are some associated federal regulations which have
an influence on port operations, but the port depends on
business to survive. That business is attracted by
efficient and relatively inexpensive services provided.
military base facility is solely run by
facility's
The
the federal government. Marketing the
elements of
capabilities to attract users is not a concern. Efficiency
is conSidered an important element in readiness and cost
15
effectiveness is required by the public, which finances
the entire operation.
In the final analysis however, costs are the key
difference in the development of each facility . For a
commercial endeavor to survive, the costs of operation
must be outweighed by the return 01" profit. The profit is
measured in currency. The profit gained by the effective
of a military base is measured in perhapsfunction
tangible, although probably more important, scales.
less
For
this reaSon the two are not considered compatible (Hedden,
1967) . There are a number of ports around the world,
developed commercially, which are used by the military. In
most cases, this dual use is simply as vessel berthing
space 01" for supply purposes. Military occupancy may tie
up berthing, transit shed 01" warehouse space. Other
buildings may be required for use as barracks for security
force 01" other personnel. If this space is not required
for the normal operation of the port, it may not be a
problem, but most ports are planned with operational peaks
in mind. When the military occupancy interferes with that,
it inhibits the overall function and development of the
port. At the Same time, a congested harbor and shore
services are not conducive to military readiness.
Separation of planning and development becomes a necessity
for both.
16
In
Alternative Definition
order to develop a set of alternatives to fixed
bases/port facilities to choose from, the functionality of
a base must be established. Although this study is
of base functions will be applied (Table
centering
categories
on ma r I time oriented support , the general
2) .
These functions may at first appear to be strictly
defense" does not always directly translate to
"military". A commercial maritime port will
military
"national
the term
in nature. but it must be noted that the term
incorporate all but one of these functions as well.
Perhaps the most outstanding functions are the three
Cs: Command, Control, and Communications. TheSe
are the key to the integration of all other
functions
functions.
Administration of information, equipment and personnel is
also a coordinating function. Operations and Logistics
involve planning, staging, emp I oymen t , deployment and
support for the base itself, as well as the supported
mission . Life support includes security, utilities and
come naturally.
quality of life.
to determine or
Political functions are not always
to implement, but some
easy
This includes symbolic presence, representational duties,
support to the host nation, public affairs, and cover for
other activities. Miscellaneous functions
research or disaster relief.
might include
The one function
17
that is perhaps most military
TABLE 2
Base Functions
(ADTECH, 1987)
Command
Control
Communications
Administration
Operations
Planning
Staging
Deployment
Employment
Sustainment
Training
Engineering
Construction
Special Operations
Psychological Operations
Intelligence
Collection
Control
Analysis
Production
Dissemination
Surveillance
Liaison Operations
Cover
Weather
Political
Symbolic Presence
Advisory Duties
International Negotiations
Representational Duties
Public Affairs
Support to Host Nation
Cover for Other Activities
18
Logistics
Planning
Staging
- Warehousing
- Assembly
- Material Handling
- Transport
Supply (All Classes)
Maintenance(Drydocks/Shops)
Transportation
Housing
Utilities
Host Nation Support
Medicine
- Care
- Evacuation
- Supply
Construction
Security Assistance
Embassy Support
Life Support
Security
Utilities
Hotel
Logistics
Quality of Life
Miscellaneous
Research and Development
Test and Evaluation
Requirements/Needs
Generation
Disaster Relief
oriented is Intelligence. Although weather data collection
is one sub-function. the collection, control, analysis,
through surveillance andgathered liaison
production
intelligence
and dissemination of various types of
operations,
functions.
is the raw purpose of a base's Intelligence
In order to incorporate all of these functions into
one package, the base facilities must be extensive. This
obviously requires sufficient acreage to incorporate the
appropriate superstructure. The need for access to the sea
unique requirement for the naval/maritimeis
This
the
increases the monumental costs of a
base.
base
establishment further still. The insurmountable obstacle
of dealing with these costs while continuing to provide
the functions necessary is at the least, difficult. If one
add the risk of losing that huge investment, it might be
difficult
project.
to generate the interest in starting such a
The risk can be significantly reduced by making the
recently such costs, brought on by the trade off of
port
Until
mobile. Unfortunately, mobility has its own costs.
durability for for mobility, have been difficult to deal
with. Since the Second World War, however, there has been
a giant leap in the technology of stable ocean platforms,
resulting from the search of hydrocarbons beneath the
ocean bottom. Additionally.
19
modular construction
techniques, initially developed during the war, have also
advanced in leaps and bounds. Finally, the development of
marine vehicles capable of lifting and/or moving extremely
large and heavy cargoes (such as the modular ocean
which can overcome most mobility/
platforms
advancements
indicated above), completes the
of
list of
durability trade off costs. Of course, not every option
can attain the maximum degree of performance in all
categories of consideration, but a nominal degree of
efficiency is probable.
20
(floating 01" otherwise) all around the world.
There
facilities
are
CHAPTER III
MOBILE BASES
History
perhaps countless examples of offshore
Giant floating oil production rigs are commonplace in the
North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. As time goes on,
station keeping propulsion systems allow for
technological
operate in deeper and deeper water.facil ities to
advances in anchoring capabilities
these
and
huge
The
Persian Gulf as well as the Gulf of Mexico are littered
with an assortment of free standing oil production rigs as
A variety of methods have been usedwell .
them. Either floated out on barges 01" on
to position
self-contained
buoyant floats, they rest on the sea floor and rise ten to
twenty meters above the surface. These oil production
platforms provide long-term platforms for large scale
industrial projects.
In most cases, these examples illustrate only a
assemble a fully functional base/port
limited
exists to
amount of the rapidly growing technology
mobile
that
facility. The knowledge gained from the operation of these
many examples will provide a starting point for the
21
development of some very flexible, multi-purpose, mobile
base construction projects.
The current growth of offshore facilities is not new
and certainly did not pop up out of nowhere. On the other
hand, the very recent growth in marine construction
technology certainly accounts for the dramatic increase in
the size and scope of the facilities currently in
operation.
In the case of mobile support of military operations,
World War II provides the backdrop for the initial
development of offshore, mobile bases. Throughout the war
in the Pac ific Ocean, the "Island Hopping" campa i gn
required a dynamic logistics and maintenance/repair
infrastructure . Otherwise allied naval forces would have
faced the threat of extended lines of communication being
cut . Underway replenishment of warships helped the effort,
but floating bases consisting of barges, modular
preconstructed piers and highly specialized ships (i. e.
repair and hospital ships) provided the replenishment
ships a base of operations close to the battle zone. This
conglomeration of support capability was usually
maintained inside an island harbor or atoll lagoon to
provide protection from the elements.
In the Atlantic and European theaters,
called for the ability to move large
invasion plans
quantities of
supplies over the beach-head after the
22
initial assault.
With no port facilities to use in the assault area,
alternatives had to be found. The "Mu l b e r r y " was one of
those ideas. A pier facility that could be floated across
the English Channel to the Normandy beach-head, it would
be anchored in place by self-contained steel pilings. One
of them was lost in a violent storm just a few days after
the Normandy landings, but another still stands today as a
monument to the conflict.
The "Mulberry" concept is the basis behind the Army's
Delong Piers, of today. Floated into place, they provide a
temporary pier facility in a crisis situation . During the
Viet Nam War, the Navy used barges and support ships
anchored together as bases for riverine and coastal patrol
boats. Support ships would move to the site of operations
far away from base logistics and maintenance support.
More recently, during the "Tanker War" in the Persian
Gulf, the U.S. Navy used large offshore construction
support barges as a base of operations. Modified with
prefabricated shelters, armor plating, landing platforms
and other equipment, this base was used to counter mining,
small boat, and other operations by Iranian naval
Moving the location of this floating base on an
forces.
irregular
basis, countered the targeting of land based missiles
(Miller, 1989).
The Falklands/Malvinas conflict recently set the
stage for perhaps the most ambitious project of its
23
kind
to date. In a matter of five months, a completely self-
contained base/port facility was
Stanley. The barge based structure
constructed at Port
(Flexiport) provides a
cost effective way to support the requirement for an alert
military posture (Tsinker,1987).
oil and gas operations, there
also
Besides
several
offshore
other large non-military oriented
are
port
facilities around the world. Some of these structures are
not new and all are examples of more long-term facilities.
Until recently, the word's largest and perhaps the
oldest floating dock was the passenger wharf in Liverpool,
England. It was built in 1874 and was about 756 meters in
length and over 24 meters wide. Flotation waS provided by
a number of steel pontoons. This was replaced in 1977 by a
new concrete floating pier, due to high operational and
maintenance costs. The new structure waS 350 meters long
and 19 meters in width. Each of the six concrete pontoons,
joined together to form the pier, were constructed in
Dublin in only 35 days (Tsinker,1987).
In Tilbury, England, another ferry/cargo pier, similar
to the original Liverpool wharf is still in operation.
Slightly newer and smaller this facility handles ocean
going cargo ships as well as passenger/vehicle ferries.
The Soviet Union also
floating pontoon piers for
uses steel and concrete
the Dnieper River ferry
services. This provides a structure flexible
24
enough to
withstand the onslaught of river, tidal and ice forces.
In Valdez, Alaska, floating pier facilities were the
contours made
anSwer to many problems.
fixed piers
Steep sloped harbor bottom
impractical and potentially
dangerous. On one side of the bay is Berth One of the oil
loading port. The lIS meter long, steel loading pier is
supported by 13 double-shelled buoyancy tanks. The pier is
used to load supertankers up to 125,000 dead weight tons
( dwt ) (Tsinker,19S7).
Across the bay, or rather in it, lies the Valdez
container terminal. The storage area is mostly land
fill, but the pier and working area is of the floating
concrete design. The 213 meter long, 30 meter wide
structure was transported over 2500 miles in just two
sections. The wharf is not only capable of handling large
container ships and barges, but it also supports a 40-ton
container crane as well. The facility regularly
accommodates Lo/Lo and Ro/Ro operations (Tsinker,19S7).
There are other examples of floating facilities in
Iquitos and Pucallpa, Peru, as well, and in Brazil a pulp
processing plant with its own port facility was built
offshore recently. On the recreation front, a complete
resort hotel was built on a barge and towed to the Great
Barrier Reef off of Australia for patrons interested in
underwater excursions for relaxation. Back in the oil
industry, the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port facility
25
(LOOP)
was completed
supertankers
in
away
1978.
from
Designed to
shore, LOOP
moor
is an
and offload
outstanding
example of deepwater anchoring technology. All in all, an
impressive list of very successful operations.
Mobility appears
Mobility
to be the solution to all the
problems. Political restrictions such as limitation of
basing rights, constantly changing political climates and
expensive forward basing of troops, are reduced in level
of concern. High investment costs are reduced through
modular preconstruction methods. Actual construction time
is also reduced, eSpecially at the base site. There will
be reduced need for site preparations such as channel
dredging, foundations 01" land grading. Once considered
nonrecoverable assets, pier facilities, landing pads and
buildings
locations.
can now be moved to new 01" more desirable
Offshore
Flexibility
bases of any kind must be flexible. There
must also be an ability to adapt a mobile facility to
changes in its employment. Moving a base of operations as
part of an advance plan 01" as an unplanned contingency
involves the possibility of relocating to a considerably
different area. Therefore, flexibility
26
is the key to
an arctic climate and perhaps others
mobility.
assembled
This
for
is not to say some facilities can be
for
more tropical areas. What is important is that a basic
design that is in use in one place can be used in other
places as well.
Also, not every location in the world is a potential
hand, a review of the various facilities now in
site for an offshore base/port facility. On the other
operation
indicate that a larger portion of the world's shorelines
are potential port sites. The grade of the harbor bottom
or the availability of level ground for efficient aviation
operations may no longer need to be a cause for concern.
In all
Construction
cases, the majority of construction for a
mobile base can be done at a location other than the
base/port site. This has many benefits.
Since the construction might be done at home, there
could be a tremendous benefit to the U.S. shipbuilding
money in the domestic economy and not possibly
industry,
investing
which is in need of a boost. This leads to
losing it. Even not considering the aspect of investment
recovery, this is a very positive side effect.
Although the construction of most offshore facilities
currently occurs outside of the U.S., the technology and
methodology for the construction is readily available
27
in
this country . The purchase of already constructed
structures for the purpose of modification to base/port
modules can further decrease costs. The recent slump in
oil and gas production around the world has left such
useful structures sitting idly, awaiting use.
Having construction occur outside of the u.s. is
an efficient option. Since the building of ast ill
port can end up being slaved to the
fixed
host nation's
capabilities. competitive methods are limited. Finding the
most economical construction yard opens the door to
further cost reduction and increase in quality .
If the host nation has no capability to support port
construction, then expensive transportation of raw
materials and labor to the site must be used. A mobile
base/port facility would require only a limited amount of
logistics support during installation.
'l'ransportation
Currently, this kind of mobility can only be
accomplished via marine transport. Only movement over the
seas can provide the transport of the massive modular
units that are required. This capability exists now in the
form of free floating modular units and super/ultra-heavy
lift vessels Cbar-g e s and ships). The ability to move a
complete basing facility and have it operational in a
matter of a few months not only exists on paper,
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but it
has been accomplished.
More specifically it should be noted that the need to
move large modular units from point to point also arose
from offshore oil and gas requirements. The huge
drilling/operations platforms sometimes had to me moved to
opposite sides of the globe.
Initially, these structures were towed from point to
point, while free floating. Costs began to rise
dramatically as the distances grew longer. This was due to
the additional structural support that was required to
protect the units from the elements and insurance costs
that are always much higher for tug and tow
t ran s p 0 r tat ion ( MAR , 198'7 # 1) .
The revolution began with the semi-submersible barge
and moved on to semi-submersible ships . These vessels
lift the unit out of the water, and welded brackets secure
the structure to the deck . Sizable reductions in insurance
and construction costs are obtained. In addition,
transportation time is slashed. A job that might take 90
days to accomplish by towing is cut to a little more than
using a semi-submersible
the air and/or
30 days
Cargoes
by
towering over 100 meters into
heavy lift ship.
extending twice the width of the transporting vessel
be moved in this fashion both inexpensively
can
and
efficiently (MAR, 1987 #1).
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There are 18 of these ships currently in operation in
the free world with the capability to support
transportation of offshore base/port facility modules
(Table 3). These ships , in addition to numerouS heavy lift
barges have the potential to provide a mode of transporta-
tion for larger permanent facilities and "rapid
deployment" of prepositioned contingency facilities. The
ability to locate a port facility on short notice, in a
remote area of the world to support a disaster relief
effort or an amphibious assault multiplies the chances of
success for both (Harris , 1973) .
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TABLE 3
CHARACTERISTICS OF SEMI-SUBMERSIBLE SHIPS:
By Operator, Flag and Number of Units
(MAR. 1987 # 1 )
SHIP
NAME
DIM(ft)
LOA/Beam
DRAFT (ft)
Trns/Sub
DECK
SUB rr t)
SPEED
(kts)
CARGO
CAP (k b )
OPERATOR: American Automar (Flag: U.S.) 1 unit
American
Cormorant 738/135 34/65 26 16
OPERATOR: Dock Express (Flag: NL) 4 units
Dock Express
#s 10 - 12 505/89 29/39 16 16
Dock Express
# 20 556/90 29/39 16 15
47 .0
12.8
14. 1
OPERATOR: Dyvi (Flag: NO) 4 units
Swan/Swift/
Teal/Tern 593/106 32/68 24
OPERATOR: I . T. C. (Flag: NO) 1 uni t
Sib ig
Venture 728/138 31/64 23
16
15
24.5
43.1
OPERATOR: Wijsmuller (Flag : NL) 8 units
Super Servant
#s 1 ,3,4 456/105 21/48 19 15 13.9
Super Servant
#s 5 & 6 465/105 20/48 19 15 13. 1
Mighty
Servant 1 525/132 31/65 26 15 21.2
Mighty
Servant 2 553/132 31/65 26 15 22.8
Mighty
Servant 3 591/132 31/65 26 15 24.3
Notes: DIM - Di me n s i o n s
LOA - Length Overall
Trns - in transit conf iguration
Sub - in submerged configuration
SPEE D - Maximum Speed
DECK - Cargo Deck De p t h
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t k t.s ) - Knots
( k t ) - kilotons
(it) - feet
CHAPTER IV
OPTIONS FOR MOBILE BASES
Overview
Current strategic planning recognizes the need for
mobile support bases for future conflicts. There are
numerous recommendations for the eventual design of mobile
ocean bases that provide a complete spectrum of
facilities. This includes stable ocean platforms
support
capable
of fixed wing aircraft operations as well as ma r I time
facilities (Figures 5 through 7). The goal is to have an
operational capability at this level by the year 2010 or
beyond (Lin, 1973) . This study will not, in any way try to
deal
is
with this effort. The capability to accomplish
well documented and its actual outcome depends on
this
the
political winds within the U.S. rather than in the regions
of concern.
The concern herein is to look at the situation as it
now stands and how to deal with the short-term problem of
basing rights. With this in mind, there are three basic
design options for a mobile overseaS base/port program to
be considered . These are: 1) the semi-submersible offshore
platform; 2) the "jack-up rig platform; and 3) the barge/
floating pier design. Although there may be other designs,
32
FIGURE 5
Mobile Ocean Basing System Concept (MOBS)
(BDM, 1988)
IS -, ?
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FIGURE (}
Mobile Operational Large Island Base (MOLL)
(BDM, 1988)
4500 ' --------~~~~
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FIGURE 7
Stable Ocean Platform
(Lin, 1973)
- ----- -- -- - - - --_.__ .-. - - - --- -
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they are all basically variations or combinations of the
above listed structures. More advanced designs have to be
considered for the long-term, but are not available now
for rapid development and deployment. The efficiency of
these three basic designs is of concern here. All three
are proven to be capable of supporting large scale mobile
facilities. A comparison of these designs provides the
basis for selecting an "off the shelf" design to modify as
required and deploy rapidly. The selected design could be
and port facility, and as a temporary support
available
operations
for immediate use as both a long-term base of
base for contingency operations, both civilian and
military. Furthermore there must also be a solid ability
to sustain this role until the ocean basing project can
fully aSSume the responsibility for these missions.
could result in a 20 to 30 year life expectancy.
This
Semi-submersible Platforms
The semi-submersible platform (Figure 8) is a popular
design for the exploration for oil and gas beneath the
ocean floor. It provides a stable platform in deep water
through the use of large ballast tanks in the bottom. When
the work platform well above the surface waves.
partially
maintain
filled, these tanks provide the buoyancy to
At the Same time, the ballast tanks "float" far enough
below the surface to not be affected by
36
the relatively
Semi-aUbmeraible Platform
(Rona. 1988)
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chaotic motion at and just below the surface (Rona, 1988).
Larger platforms can support the drilling operation
by housing dozens of workers and support personnel.
Literally a floating town, all the essentials are provided
for. A helicopter platform provides for the primary
physical link to the outside world. but ferries and work
boats are also able to moor.
Maintaining position is accomplished through the use
of lines moored to the ocean bottom or by some sort of
station keeping systems that uses propellers or water
jets to maneuver the platform in place. Anchoring provides
the only 1 imi t to the depth of the water were this
structure may operate (BDM, 1988) .
is held above the surface of the ocean by
The
capability
structure
Jack-up Rig
jack-up platform (Figure 9)
to support the drilling
provides the
operation.
same
This
legs
(usually 3). This of course limits the depth of water in
which a particular platform might be able to stand.
After being floated out to its site, the legs, until
now rising hundreds of meters into the air, are cranked
down until they touch the ocean floor. The platform is
lifted out of the water by continued cranking of the
providing a very stable working platform.
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legs
/
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FIGURE 9
t FacilityRigs PorJack-up DM 1988)(8 ,
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•
to keep it in place. An anchoring system may
Since
requirement
the jack-up rig is free standing there is no
be employed for safety reaSons however, but this will not
actually affect the location of the platform beyond the
limit of the legs (BDM, 1988).
Barges/Floating Piers
Use of a barge or a specifically constructed floating
pier structure (Figure 10) for an operation is the third
option.
transport
Very large offshore work barges are designed
and support heavy equipment to be used in
to
off-
shore projects. Specifically constructed to withstand the
harsh conditions on the open sea, the offshore work barge
size andon top of the water. Due to its massivefloats
bulk, it provides a semi-stable work platform, even in
rough weather.
Floating piers can be assembled through the USe
these barges as well as be specifically constructed
of
to
meet any need. The use of either or both of these designs
provides a platform that can be both moored or anchored in
place (Rona, 1988).
Barges of this type have been modified to do many
jobs from transporting various cargoes to supporting a
variety of projects. Since this work requires the movement
of often very heavy loads through sometimes harsh
environmental conditions, support of an operations base or
40
FIGURE 10
Barge/Floating Pier
(Lin, 1982)
· i
I •
- --:..~
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port facility is well within the capability of these
barges. Various types of floating piers
throughout the world today (see Chapter III
are in use
History) •
providing reliable and usually inexpensive port facilities
everywhere they are employed. Both variations, used
separately or together, can provide another accessible
design for a mobile base.
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CHAPTER V
LOGIC FOR ANALYSIS
Objective
The purpose of this analysis is to compare the three
three criteria . These are:
basic concepts described in Chapter IV, on the basis of
mobility, flexibility and cost.
Two scales were used to judge all factors. They are:
use as a long-term base/port, and 2) for a contingency
operation.
Mobility is judged on transportability and
availability on short notice. Transportability is simply
the ease with which each design can be transported to the
assembly site. Availability scoring reflects the ability
of each design to be deployed and/or redeployed, as well
as the expediency with which this may be accomplished.
Flexibility scoring is based on several subsets.
These are: L) location, 2) mission , 3) environmental, 4)
supportability, and 5) overall physical capabilities . The
primary consideration for location flexibility is the
j ud g me n t
be used .
of how many locations a particular design
Mission flexibility is a function of how
might
many
different missions might be fully supported. Environmental
considerations include the adaptability of a design
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for
use in an assortment of climatic regions. Supportability
considerations factor in the options available to
consideration
logistically
capabilities
support
include
the base. Overall
of the
physical
actual
construction and/or modification efforts that may be
required to build the design and/or update it for the
requirements set upon it.
Cost factors considered are both the political and
capital costs for the construction and use of each design.
Political costs are a judgment of the effort required to
make use of a the design as required (this includes: level
of negotiation overSeas and popular support at home) and
the gains that might be accomplished once that design is
in use. Capital costs include the consideration of all
factors that influence the actual amount of money spent to
construct/modify, transport, store and use the design.
Grading
All factors are "graded" on a scale of zero (0.0
poor) to four point zero (4.0 - best). These scores are
recorded on Table 4 at the end of Chapter VI. In addition
to a factor by factor comparison of scores, the table also
reflects an overall Score for each design.
All scoring areas are not given equal consideration
however. Mobility is the primary factor in this analysis.
It is important to note that in order
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to overcome the
drawbacks of fixed port/base facilities, the alternative
must be as mobile as possible. If the facility cannot be
moved with relative ease, it is not capable of
the missions which may possibly arise.
fulfilling
Of secondary importance is the flexibility of the
unit(s). The ability to adapt to any situation is vital to
the Success of a mobile facility. Less variation reduces
the number of choices, which in turn reduces the complex
analysis required for making a decision. This is an
economy of time and effort.
costs are considered as well as capital, it
tertiary AlthoughThe
political
important to
concern is the cost
note that when a crisis
factor.
arises the
is
costs
become manageable . Crisis management negotiations are one
of the most expedient of political concepts. There is
always a quick way to solve a problem in ideo logy when
lives are at stake. Additionally the financial burden is
put
date.
on the "back burner" to be figured out at a later
For these reasons grading of each area of
consideration are calculated in percentages of the overall
grade. Mobility is assessed as 45 percent (45%) of the
final score . Flexibility is assessed as 35 percent (35%),
and Costs will be 20 percent (20%) of the overall grade.
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Scenarios
Scores, although subjective, are not arbitrary.
Judgment of each design is based on consideration of each
earlier,the two scales of measurement discussed
factor
reflect
in relation to four hypothetical scenarios which
which are based on current events.
outlined fictional
contingency operation. four
future
They were
These
reflectbe low,
andlong-term use
scenarios,
situations
created solely for the purpose of this study and are not
based on any form of military plan or governmental
strategy. They only provide for various situations that
might occur and provide a use for a mobile base/port
facility.
Scenario A
The political atmosphere in the Philippines has
forced the government, up until recently supportive of
U.S. base facilities, to severely limit U.S. basing
rights. One of the primary facilities to be shut down will
be the naval facilities at Subic Bay . Given one year to
scale down the U.S. military operation there, a new or at
least temporary repair and supply facility must be found
for U.S. Seventh Fleet units.
One option has been offered by the government of
Singapore. Harbor and administrative space would be
provided on long-term lease basis for a period to be
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up front terms
negotiated.
facilities
Although
available,
there
the
is more than
of
adequate
the deal
indicate that this option will be very expensive. Finally,
despite the stability and friendly nature of the present
government, there is no guarantee how the u.s. presence
will affect that view.
The second option is to construct a facility at Guam.
This will be a massive project however, and under normal
circumstances could take many years before a facility
could be in even limited operation. This is due to the
very limited repair and support superstructure currently
in place there.
Scenario B
The U.S. has been offered basing rights in the south
african nation of Namibia. That country's young government
is trying to fend off the growing support for a foreign
backed guerrilla group. It is believed that the presence
of U.S. military in the country will solidify the
government's position and that the hard currency from the
base leases and the probable labor requirement will help
bolster the economy.
U.S. is anxious to take advantage of this
in
The
the expectation that the Namibian government's
offer
plan
acceSs to the South Atlantic,
will succeed. Not only will this give the U.S. direct
but it provides an opportun-
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i ty to offer a sampling of good will to the friendly
nations
trying
in the area while putting pressure on the others
to expand their influence through covert actions
against their neighbors.
Scenario C
The "d r u g war in Columbia has raged on. That
nation's government, in an effort to escalate the preSsure
on the drug cartels has requested, among other military
aid, direct U.S. Navy and Coast Guard support along the
coast. This is expected to drastically reduce the flow of
weapons to the cartel forces who have organized effective
special forces type military units in the jungles.
The request for aid includes an offer of basing
rights and support on a temporary basis. It is not thought
prudent.
Columbian harbor/basehowever,
would be
that use of
Besides the lack of
facilities
sufficient
facilities to support an effort in such scale, it is not
there would
military
adequate sincebelieved
Columbian
that security
units are
be
believed to be well
infiltrated by cartel informants and operatives.
Scenario D
A violent earthquake and resulting mud slides have
devastated many cities and towns in South America. Hardest
hit has been the nation
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of Peru. The government,
traditionally weak in the rural areas, has accepted an
offer of U.s. relief aid in the crisis. Neighboring
countries are busy responding to their own disaster relief
projects and can provide no assistance to the Peruvian
governmen t.
The damage extends to the few seaside towns in the
country, leaving virtually no place from which
the rescue effort. The remote villages perched
to stage
upon the
massive mountains or buried in the dense jungles make
access via both the air and ground difficult.
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All
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
CHAPTER VI
Analysis: Mobility
three designs are capable of being transported
as modules, in three ways. Each can be towed directly
through the sea, towed on a barge across the sea or
ferried across aboard a heavy lift ship. In the
the ship or barge, the primary choice is use of
case of
a semi-
submersible vessel. Towing directly through the sea is the
least desirable of the three options (Figure 11). This is
because of the risk of damage from heavy seas (this will
also figure into the cost evaluation later).
Within this option however, it is clear that use of
the barge/floating pier design is much more desirable
since these structures are in fact constructed to
withstand the seas. The jack-up rig design is not intended
for long haul towing. In this mode of transportation it is
not very stable. The semi-submersible rig, although quite
stable in its partially submerged state, is not efficient.
This is due to the mass of the structure under the water,
which puts a tremendous drag force on the towing vessel.
In this condition, a very powerful tug must be used,
decreasing the options of tow vessels available, and
50
the
FIGURE II
Deployment Flexibility:
Towing vs. Semi-submersible Ship
(MAR, 1986)
Tr"lnsit Radius:
14 Days for Towing
8 Days for 16 Knot Capable Semi-submersible Ship
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speed of the tow is dramatically reduced from an already
slow pace. In the full float condition, the semi-
is only slightly more stable than thesubmersible rig
jack-up rig.
Transport aboard a semi-submersible barge or ship is
the more efficient means (Figure 12). Here again however
the considerations favor the barge/float pier design. All
three designs when loaded in this manner overhangs the
sides of the carrying vessel, sometimes by hundreds of
feet. In the case of the jack-up and semi-submersible rigs
however, the height above the deck adds to the stability
problem during loading, transport and unloading.
The semi-submersible vessel is inherently unstable
during the transition from submerged to full float
condition. This is most critical during loading, at the
moment the deck breaks the surface. Due to the low center
of gravity for the barge or pier, although not eliminated,
this is less a problem (MAR, 1987 #1).
In all three design cases, however, the speed of the
transportation can be most increased by use of the semi-
submersible heavy lift ship. Its barge counterpart is
restricted to a three or four knot speed compared to
thirteen to fifteen knots.
The availability factor is highly influenced by the
transportation options (which will also affect flexibility
considerations later)
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With more transport options
FIGURE 12
Deployment Flexibility:
Semi-submepsible Heavy Lift Ship
( MAR, 19 8 7 # 1 )
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available for its use, the barge/pier option has the
maximum advantage . This is of most concern in the case of
a contingency operation. Rapid availability is of prime
concern here. If a nominal sized tug is all that can be
obtained on short-notice transportation can begin
immediately. The limited number of semi-submersible barges
and even fewer similar ships (18 in the world at this
reduction in transport time) of the semi-submersible
however,
depending
increase
note,
(thus
ship
to
their usefor
fair
in speed
timethe leadthe
situation. It is only
tremendous increase
the
the
on
that
maytime)
could in fact overcome a lead time delay. In this case,
again all three designs would be available.
The
Analysis: Flexibility
most difficult distinction to make among the
three designs is the one of "most" flexible. There is no
way to truthfully say one design is not flexible. The
a design that can provide the broadest
purpose
find
of this analysis is not to do that, but rather
spectrum of
options.
It is quite obvious in studying the semi-submersible
rig that it is not suited to very shallow water since the
buoyancy tanks are well beneath the water's surface. On
the other hand, the jack-up rig is quite well suited to
relatively shallow water, but will not function in a deep
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water area. In the case of the barge/pier option, since it
floats, it can essentially be used in any depth of water.
Because of relatively shallow draft it can be put into use
right up to a shore line. The primary drawback is the
susceptibility of the design to rough seas.
For a contingency operation, the scoring of all three
is high. For long-term use however there is a slight
advantage to the barge/pier concept. Given the planning
and coordination that is required for such an undertaking
as a major port of operations and the ability of the
barge/pier construction to function close or up to the
beach, there are many ways to reduce the risk of sea
damage. The jack-up rig and semi-submersible designs would
most likely require shore based construction of facilities
to support them offshore. There is little chance of either
having a direct physical link to shore. This would require
separate piers or a helipad for that connectivity.
Finding a protected bay or inlet is a simple matter
a breakwaterand
for
if that is impossible, construction of
sea defense is going to be required anyway. If there
is no suitable location ashore to construct the support
for an offshore base, then these are uselessfacilities
options.
There are numerous missions that could be required of
each design. The difference in ability of each to support
those missions is not measurable. Therefore there can be
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no standout in this factor.
Location of the base is integral in the ability to
support it logistically. All three designs can be used for
heliport operations and as pier for air and sea support.
is no connectivity to the shore,If
land
there
link is lost (road and rail) .
however,
This gives
the
the
barge/pier concept an advantage, especially for a long-
term requirement.
The physical capabilities of all three designs are
not considered from the engineering point of view. The
ability technologically to efficiently construct each is a
constant. It is however important to note that the major
producers of all three currently are not located in the
u.s. This now becomes a question of ease of construction
(purchase of already existing structures for modification
also entails a cost factor). Again the barge/pier design
has a high margin of favorability. The semi-submersible
rig design is much more detailed and require a great deal
of more specialized expertise. This even more true for the
'jack-up' rig design. This expertise and the capabilities
that go with it are located overseas. Construction of
barges and floating piers is much less complex and can be
accomplished much more quickly if the need arises .
The complexity of jack-ups and semi-submersibles
severely limits the flexibility of their use. This, in
addition to the scoring edge of the barge/pier concept in
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location, environment and supportability, gives it overall
superiority for flexibility.
The
Analysis: Cost
examination of the political costs is extremely
subjective and can be interpreted over the long-term in a
spectrum of analysis. Therefore it is acknowledged that
there is room for considerable debate over the details of
political thought on the subject. The analysis herein is
an attempt to look at only the broadest aspects of the
problem. Also, it is clear that the capital costs of any
project funded by the public, is considered a part of the
political costs. The separation of the two is not easy and
each must be kept in mind while considering the other.
The semi-submersible design possesses a clear
advantage in its ability for use with the least amount of
political wrangling. It is capable of being used in a free
floating mode, unencumbered by moorings or anchors. If a
station-keeping propulsion system is used, the semi-
submersible provides a stable base that can be operated
outside of terr itorial waters . Continental shelf rights
would have to be conSidered if any of the designs were to
be anchored to the floor . As long as there were no
perceived threat to a nation's Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) , it would be a great advantage to have a base of
operations off the coas t .
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The advantage of reduced
political costs could be considered as counterbalanced by
the enormous increase in financial support that would be
required 10r such a system . The long-term use of the semi-
submersible in this mode could become very expensive in
terms of the energy requ irements for such an endeavor.
All three designs have the great advantage of being
mobile, and therefore provide the ability to recover the
majority of investments . The leverage of this is in favor
of the U.S. in any negotiation for the establishment of a
base. The very existence of a mobile base capability also
provides for similar leverage when faced with an
unfriendly negotiation for a fixed base . Although the loss
of the fixed base may be costly, the ability to shake off
the absolute necessity for maintaining that fixed base
gives the opposition more to think about. This is
especially true if the threat of closure is not
wholehearted.
The money side is very different however. The semi-
submersible and jack-up designs are mechanically much more
complicated . The cost of construction and/or purchase
would obviously be much greater. The ability to construct
these designs in this country also boosts these costs. The
technical know-how is there, but as mentioned earlier, the
infrastructure for construction is currently centered
overSeaS. This would suggest an overseas purchase, as
being the more economical route. This in itself
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poses a
political problem, assuming there is a desire to do the
construction in the U.S. This provides jobs (a major item
simplicity in the construction of a barge/float
deficit problem) Finally, the lower overall
on
also
the "American Agenda" at any time). U.S.
keeps the cash at home (this aids in
construction
the trade
cost and
facility,
make that an easier fiscal pill to swallow when the time
comes for a budget minded Congress to approve funding .
The need to construct shore support facility when
using an offshore design also adds to the costs. Once
again, there is an opportunity to invest capital into at
least a part of the facility that could be lost by the
U.S. government. In any case, the ability to pack up and
move the entire facility as easily as it was installed
provides the best negotiating position and the least
chance of loss. Moreover, the barge/floating pier design
not only provides the best method for accomplishing this,
but also has greater flexibility and transportability.
Both of these traits will make it the preferred choice of
the efficiency minded politician.
59
TABLE 4
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Semi-submersible Jack-up Barge/Float
Mobility (45%) : 3.0 2.5 4.0
Transportability 3.0 2.0 4.0
Availability 3.0 3.0 4.0
Flexibility (35%) : 2.6 2.6 3.0
Location 2.0 2 .0 3.0
Mission 3.0 3.0 3.0
Environmental 3.0 2.0 2.0
Supportability 2.0 2.0 3.0
Physical 2.0 3.0 4.0
Cost (20%) : 3.0 3.0 3.5
Political 4 .0 3.0 3.0
Capital 2.0 3.0 4.0
Overall (100%):
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2.9 2.6 3.6
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
Summary
Long-term debate over the solution to the overseas
basing dilemma is not desirable . Solutions to the problem
are under development. Mobile ocean basing systems designs
seem to be valid alternatives. Although the technology for
these designs is available in theory, there is no
capability at present to develop or deploy any of these
alternatives in the near future .
Meanwhile, there are interim options available. Jack-
up rigs, semisubmersible platforms and floating piers are
all designs which are currently being used in various
marine industries around the world. All three have proven
to be capable of performing a wide variety of tasks in the
harsh. often rapidly changing marine environment. This
pointedly indicates that there is working technology
currently available to assemble a very versatile mobile
base/port capability in the U.S. in a matter of months.
The clear choice offered by current in use technology
for mobile operations bases and port facilities is the use
of large offshore support barges and/or specially designed
floating pier designs (Figures 13 & 14). The advantages of
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FIGURE 13
Temporary Floating Support Facility
( MAR. 19 8 7 # 2)
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FIGURE 14
Long Term Advance Logistic Support Base
(Harris, 1973)
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this
cost,
design, in the areas of mobility, flexibility
clearly support the given hypothesis.
and
In addition to the barge/floating pier design's
list of attributes, it has a rather long history
long
of
service as both a contingency base of operations in a
crisis and as a versatile long -term port/base facility, as
well . Its ability to fit into the most situations, in less
time and with the least difficulty (politically,
financially and physically) gives it the best chance of
succeSs in the current world environment. In the vast
majority of conceivable scenarios a floating base or port
facility will provide the superstructure required to
support the mission, whatever it may be.
There as yet, is no real substitute for a fully
capable fixed land base of operations. Although mobility
has some definitive advantages, there are still many trade
offs, including durability, which prevent a completely
satisfactory one for one exchange. There is no doubt
however, that under the less than desirable circumstances
now facing the U.S., in its quest for forward support of
its overseas interests, that an immediate mobile,
deployable base/port capability is required. Until the
more exotic designs can be put into production, use of a
barge based or other floating pier design
choice.
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is the best
Recommendations
It is imperative that an interim plan be developed
for dealing with the overseas basing problem. All of the
designs examined herein have already been studied as part
of the long-term solution. Therefore, there is no need for
additional technical or fiscal study. The need is for a
plan to be drawn up using the existing data. Long-term
base facilities admittedly require some planning before
construction, but a plan which would detail the
design, construction methods, and negotiation to be used
foundation forin the event of need, will establish the
the use of such structures in the future.
On the other hand, a series of offshore support
barges should be constructed and/or purchased as soon as
possible. These barges need to be modified for rapid
deployment and USe for contingency operations. These
facilities must also be maintained in a ready status at
various locations (in the U.S. or around the world) in the
event a crisis might arise. This can be accomplished in
less than two years, given government procurement
processes
movement
and shipyard capabilities. Above
to incorporate this capability into the
all, the
regular
workings of the U.S . defense structure as soon as
possible, is imperative .
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